What can be learned from Spinoza's deflnitions and axioms about what he took to be the activity he describes by the verb 'cogitare' and its cognate noun 'cogitatio 9 ? The second axiom of Part II of the Ethics, "Homo cogitat" is followed by another about the modes of cogitatio: it lays down (i) that there can be no modus cogitandi (such as love, desire, or whatever is designated by the word 'affectas animV) y unless in the individual who has it there is an idea of the thing it is about, and (ii) that there can be an idea without any other modus cogitandi (EILA3). This directs attention to the definition of "idea": namely,
Dico potius conceptum, quam perceptionem, quia perceptionis nomen indicare videtur, Mentem ab objecto pati. At conceptus actionem mentis exprimere videtur.
And that prompts one to ask: What is the conceptus a mind forms, simply because it is a res cogitans?
Still, we have learned something. We have not learned what 'ideas' are (Spinoza's Latin word 'idea* cannot be better rendered into English than by adoption) but we have learned something about their function in thinking. The most elementary exercise of thinking is forming an idea; and forming an idea is an action, not something caused ab objecto. This presupposes that ideas have objects. And that should remind us of EIA6, that a true idea must agree with its object. That does not strictly presuppose that all ideas are true or false, but it strongly suggests it; and, as we shall see, Spinoza believes it (EIIP49D). So, from the definitions and axioms of Ethics I and II, we are entitled to infer: (1) that merely forming an idea is thinking, and all thinking involves forming ideas; (2a) that ideas have objects, and (2b) are true or false; (3) that if they are true they agree with their objects; and (4) that their objects do not cause them to be formed.
Since forming an idea is sufficient and necessary for thinking, and since all the definitions and axioms tell us about the internal character of ideas, as distinct from what does or does not cause them, is contained in (2a), (2b), and (3), we must begin with them. What is it for an idea to be true or false? What is it for something to be the object of an idea -to have a relation to an idea usually signified in Latin by putting the noun or noun phrase standing for the Secondly, he does say that it is dangerous to confuse ideas with their verbal expressions. Propositional theorists characteristically find the relation of language to the world to be relatively unproblematic, and that of Cartesian
